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Abstract
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege recognized
by common law. In the corporate context, the attorney-client
privilege exists between control group-officers and corporate
counsel. That privilege extends to communication collected from
lower level employees which encourages the frank communication
to gather all relevant information to adequately advise the
corporate client. But does information gathered from an employee
after termination enjoy that privilege? The Upjohn rationale for the
attorney-client privilege erodes when the sole focus of privilege
focuses on an attorney-client relationship. Specifically, the
Washington Supreme Court deviated from the Upjohn rationale
which corrodes the fundamental principles of the attorney-client
privilege. This comment explains the long-standing tradition that
attorney-client privilege extends beyond the agency relationship
and evaluates how the Washington Supreme Court’s latest opinion
frustrates the spirit of the Upjohn and privilege rationales.

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine – as corporate counsel – notice is received of a
complaint alleging company misconduct. An initial inquiry reveals
that an internal investigation must be launched in order to
determine the legitimacy of the complaint. The process begins with
informing the client-corporation of the anticipated internal
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investigation. The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence
which protects the confidentiality of communications between an
attorney and a client.1 As a general rule, the attorney-client
privilege bars an attorney from disclosing information to anyone
outside the client.2 Evaluating whether communications are
privileged becomes convoluted when servicing a client-corporation.3
Application of the privilege to the communications between an
attorney and a corporate client, a legal entity, is more complicated
because “any number of people can act for or speak on behalf of the
corporation, including its officers, directors, employees or other
agents.”4 Thus, the identity of the “client,” may not be clear and
courts have grappled with how to define the “client,” in the
corporate context for purposes of the application of the privilege.5
This comment will discuss the historical significance of the
attorney-client privilege in the context of corporate internal
investigations.6 It will address whether protections established in
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) extend to postemployment communications with former employees. Specifically,
it will discuss how the first and foremost goal of an attorney
performing an investigation is to take all necessary steps to ensure
that the investigation is privileged to the full extent permitted by
law and how that goal has become somewhat muddled following
Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist., 281 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016).7
Finally, this comment will propose that post-employment
communications with former employees should enjoy privilege only
when the conduct of the former employee, while employed,
embroiled the company in liability.

II. BACKGROUND
Common law has embraced the attorney-client privilege as the
oldest privilege for confidential communications. 8 The purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and clients. 9 The privilege

1. CAROLE BASRI & LUKE SEMAR, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRACTICE
GUIDE, § 19.02 (2018).
2. See DAN K. WEBB, ROBERT W. TARUN & STEVEN F. MOLO, CORPORATE
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 6.02 (Law Journal Press 2017) (defining
information (1) a communication; (2) made in confidence; (3) between a person
who is, or is about to become, a client; and (4) a lawyer; (5) for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice or assistance).
3. Id. at 6-18.
4. BASRI & SEMAR, supra note 1, at § 19.02.
5. Id.
6. WEBB, TARUN & MOLO, supra note 2, at 6-18.
7. Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist., 281 P.3d 1188, 1189 (Wash. 2016).
8. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
9. See WEBB, TARUN & MOLO, supra note 2, at § 6.03 (discussing that there
are four primary reasons support imposing this virtually absolute rule of
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permits an attorney to conduct a robust investigation in order to
adequately advise her client of the issues being investigated. 10 In
Upjohn, the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege
extends to corporate clients and it rests on the ability of the attorney
to gather all information that relates to the client’s need for
representation.11 An attorney’s inadequate gathering of information
can frustrate her professional mission to deliver complete and
informed advice to the client.12 In the corporate context, it will
frequently be employees beyond the control group-officers and
agents responsible for directing the company’s actions in response
to legal advice who will possess the information needed by the
corporation’s attorney.13 The Upjohn court considered several
factors to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate setting.14
As part of the internal investigation, counsel may speak to
current and sometimes former employees to obtain all necessary
information to inform the client-corporation.15 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Upjohn clarified that interviews between
confidentiality. First, it encourages clients to communicate fully and frankly
with their lawyers and to seek legal assistance early. Second, it assists lawyers
in providing competent counsel, which is possible only through a thorough
understanding of the facts and motivations involved in a matter. Third, it
promotes compliance with the law by allowing lawyers and clients to discuss
issues freely in an effort to resolve legal problems. Fourth, it promotes the
ultimate ends of justice by fostering informed, and therefore vigorous, advice
and advocacy).
10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388 (1981).
11. Id. at 388.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 390
(stating: Middle-level -- and indeed lower-level -- employees can, by
actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in
serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees
would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is
adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties).
14. See Youngs v. PeaceHealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 650-51 (2014) (citing
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394) (discussing the factors to determine scope of
attorney-client privilege including that investigations: (1) were made at the
direction of corporate superiors, (2) were made by corporate employees, (3) were
made to corporate counsel acting as such, (4) concerned matters within the
scope of the employee's duties, (5) revealed factual information “'not available
from upper-echelon management,”' (6) revealed factual information necessary
“'to supply a basis for legal advice,”' and whether the communicating employee
was sufficiently aware that (7) he was being interviewed for legal purposes, and
(8) the information would be kept confidential).
15. See Palmina M. Fava, Mor Wetzler & Morgan A. Heavener, Where
Privilege Protection Ends in Internal Investigations, LAW360, 1 (Mar. 22, 2013,
12:39 PM) www.law360.com/articles/426424/where-privilege-protection-endsin-internal-investigations (discussing as part of most internal anti-corporation
investigations, counsel will have reason to speak to current and sometimes
former employees in an effort to understand the events under investigation).
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corporate-counsel and non-management corporate agents may be
privileged and that privilege belongs to the corporation. 16 Mention
of “former employees” in the opinion was limited to the concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger who proposed a general rule that
when an employee “or former employee speaks at the direction of
the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed
conduct within the scope of employment,” the communication is
privileged.17 To preserve privilege to the corporation, corporatecounsel must issue “Upjohn warnings” to its employees.18
The Upjohn doctrine has been settled law for over thirty-five
years.19 However, the Washington Supreme Court in Newman was
of the opinion that Upjohn did not expressly answer the question of
whether the attorney-client privilege extends to post-employment
communications between corporate counsel and former
employees.20 There, the court held that post-employment
communications with former employees are not privileged under
the Upjohn doctrine.21 Instead, the court concluded that Upjohn
does not justify applying the attorney-client privilege outside of the
employer-employee relationship.22 The “bright line” test enunciated
in Newman appears to have struck a substantial blow to the Upjohn
privilege and the way investigations are organized and performed.23
16. See id. at 4 (discussing that: (1) the communications are necessary for
counsel's representation, (2) concern matters within the employee's corporate
duties, and (3) are kept confidential. Once the privilege is established, any
determination of whether to waive privilege rests with the corporate decision
maker(s), which may be senior management or the board of directors); see also
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, W., concurring) (expressing the view that the
court, although properly holding that the communications in the case at bar
were protected by the attorney-client privilege, should have made clear that, as
a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when an employee or
former employee speaks with an attorney at the direction of the management
regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment,
provided the attorney is one authorized by the management to inquire into the
subject and is seeking information to assist counsel in evaluating whether the
employee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation, assessing the legal
consequences, if any, of that conduct, or formulating appropriate legal
responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to
that conduct.).
17. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, W., concurring).
18. See id. at 394 (requiring that in order to enjoy the Upjohn privilege, the
court must determine that (1) communications were made by direction of
superiors to obtain legal advice, (2) communications contained information
needed by corporate counsel to form legal advice, (3) the information
communicated was within the scope of the employees corporate duties, (4)
employee was aware that the reason for communicating was for the
corporations benefit and behalf, and (5) communications were ordered to be kept
confidential and remained confidential).
19. Id.
20. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
21. Id. at 1189.
22. Id. at 1191.
23. See People v. Riccardi, 281 P.3d 1, 11 (Cal. 2012) (quoting that
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The Supreme Court of Washington’s decision certainly changes the
rules of the road for internal investigations. Or does it? The purpose
of this comment is to analyze Newman and Upjohn, and then
determine how Newman affects performing an attorney-led
investigation.

A. Summary of the Newman Decision
Newman involved an investigation about a serious personal
injury case.24 Newman brought suit against Highland School
District (“Highland”) on behalf of Matthew Newman who suffered a
brain injury at football practice. 25 The following day, his coach
made him play in a football game which exacerbated his condition
and resulted in permanent brain injury.26 Prior to trial, Highland’s
counsel interviewed several former employee coaches and appeared
on their behalf at their depositions. 27 The trial court denied
Newman’s motion to disqualify Highland’s counsel from
representing the former coaches, which claimed a conflict of interest
under local rules of professional conduct.28 Newman then sought
discovery concerning communications between Highland's counsel
and its former coaches.29 Highland moved for a protective order to
shield those communications, asserting attorney-client privilege.30
The court denied the protective order and directed Highland to
respond to Newman's discovery requests. 31 The issue on appeal
before the Washington Supreme Court was whether postemployment communications between former employees and
corporate counsel received protection under the Upjohn doctrine.32
The Newman court relied on Upjohn as the seminal case for
interpreting corporate-client privilege.33 Highland argued that
Upjohn is a flexible approach which encompasses post-employment
interviews and communications with former employees. 34 The
Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument because the test
Highland’s argument for extending the attorney-client privilege to its
communications with the former coaches emphasizes that these former
employees may possess vital information about matters in litigation, and that
their conduct while employed may expose the corporation to vicarious liability.
These concerns are not unimportant, but they do not justify expanding the
attorney-client privilege beyond its purpose).
24. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1189.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (determining that Highland’s counsel created a conflict of interest
when counsel appeared for the former employee coaches).
28. Id.
30. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. 383.
33. See id.
34. People v. Winbush, 387 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Cal. 2017).
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was beyond the scope of the test established in Upjohn.35
The Washington Supreme Court held that when the employeremployee relationship terminates, the agency relationship
terminates.36 An agency relationship entails a shared duty between
the employee and employer.37 Without an agency relationship, the
former employee can no longer bind the corporation. Thus, the
attorney no longer owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and
confidentiality to the corporation.38 The Newman court reasoned
that without a duty to the employer, the former employee is
indistinguishable from third-party witnesses who may be freely
interviewed by either party.39 Therefore, Newman limits the normal
(or expected) reach of the Upjohn doctrine to current employees.40

B. The Upjohn Doctrine Revisited
To better understand the reasoning of Newman, a thorough
analysis of Upjohn is in order. In Upjohn, foreign subsidiaries of
defendant-corporation made “questionable payments” to a foreign
government.41 Corporate counsel began an internal investigation
and sent a questionnaire to all foreign managers requesting details
regarding the alleged payments. 42 Counsel believed the
questionnaires were protected under the attorneys’ work product,
as the questionnaires were prepared in anticipation of litigation. 43
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 44 Instead, the Sixth
Circuit applied the control group test, 45 holding that the privilege
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting that everything changes when employment ends.
When the employer-employee relationship terminates, this generally
terminates the agency relationship. As a result, the former employee can no
longer bind the corporation and no longer owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and
confidentiality to the corporation).
37. See Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 n.1 (D. Conn. 1999)
(stating “[a]ccording to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
[§ 73 cmt. e], the attorney-client privilege would not normally attach to
communications between former employees and counsel for the former
employer” in the absence of “a continuing duty to the corporation” based on
agency principles); see also Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303,
306 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (recognizing “there may be situations where the former
employee retains a present connection or agency relationship with the client
corporation” that would justify application of the privilege).
38. Id.
39. Newman, 281 P.3d 1188.
40. See id. at 1198 (citing that although we follow a flexible approach to
application of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, we hold that
the privilege does not broadly shield counsel's post-employment
communications with former employees).
41. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 383.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 388.
45. Id. at 390.
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applied to high-level executives and board members only.46
Pursuant to the control group test, mid to low-level employees were
excluded from the privilege.47
The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly overruled the control group
test adopted by the Sixth Circuit. 48 The Supreme Court held that
the test formulated by the Sixth Circuit overlooked the underlying
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is to encourage “full
and frank communication” between attorneys and their clients. 49
The Upjohn privilege promotes a broader public policy to ensure
attorneys adequately counsel their clients. 50 Attorney-client
privilege exists to not only protect the attorney in providing
professional advice, but also to allow the client to give information
to the lawyer to enable her to “provide sound and informed advice
to the client.”51 The Supreme Court held that a witness protected by
the privilege will likely disclose more complete, pertinent
information as a result of such protection. 52
Upjohn Company’s low to middle-level managers and agents
embroiled the company in bourgeoning liability. 53 In response,
corporate-counsel conducted an internal investigation to explore the
employees’ potential misconduct.54 The Supreme Court held that
middle-level and lower-level employees can embroil the corporation
into serious legal difficulties. 55 The Court also held that these
employees possess relevant information the corporate counsel
needs to provide adequate advice to the corporate-client.56 The
potential information the non-executive can give to the counsel is
essential in counsel’s pursuit to provide adequate advice and
guidance to the client.57 The exclusion of non-executives from the
privilege exception frustrates the underlying purpose of the
attorney-client privilege because counsel will be faced with a
“Hobson’s choice.”58 The attorney will be forced to either interview
former employees in which privilege may not apply or solely
interview top-level officials.59 This Hobson’s choice is problematic
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of A Party’s Former
Employees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and Constraints, 51 MD. L. REV. 239,
240 (1992) (asserting that former employees often possess information that can
be helpful and even vital to the resolution of anticipated or pending litigation
involving the employer).
56. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 388.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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because if counsel only interviews top level employees, “he or she
may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what
happened.”60
The Upjohn court did not address the issue of whether
conversations with former employees is protected under privilege.61
But, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, reasoned that
conversations with former employees should enjoy privilege in some
contexts.62 However, communications would be privileged between
a former employee and the client’s corporate counsel if the
communication involves conduct or information which occurred
within the scope of the former employee’s employment. 63 The
privilege may apply to the former employees if: (1) their conduct has
bound or would bind the corporation; (2) there are legal
consequences arising from the former employee’s conduct; or (3)
counsel forms appropriate legal responses to actions that have been
or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct. 64 Under this
framework, post-employment communications with witnesses,
including former employees, should enjoy privileged protections
because conduct of former employees can embroil the corporation in
difficulties.65

C. The Treatment of Former Employees After Upjohn
and Before Newman
Since Upjohn, the majority of courts have adopted Chief
Justice Burger’s approach of affording attorney-client privilege to
former employee communications in certain contexts. 66 For
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (CA8
1978) (en banc); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491492 (CA7 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163-1165 (SC 1974).
66. See Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
privilege applied to former employees); Infosystems, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 303
(affirming that there may be situations where the former employee retains a
present connection or agency relationship with the client corporation, or where
the present-day communication concerns a confidential matter that was
uniquely within the knowledge of the former employee when he worked for the
client corporation, such that counsel’s communications with this former
employee must be cloaked with the privilege in order for meaningful factgathering to occur); Better Gov’t Bureau v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582,
606 (4th Cir. 1997) (former employee need not answer questions concerning
interview with former employer's counsel); In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in
Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same); Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40 (finding communications between former
employee and corporate counsel privileged); Surles v. Air France, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10048 at 18 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2001) (stating “[a]dditionally, any
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instance, in Hanover Insurance Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t.,
the Eastern District of Louisiana found that the Louisiana Supreme
Court would recognize the existence of a privilege between counsel
for a corporation and a former employee of the corporation. 67
Specifically, the privilege exists where:
(1) the former employee was employed by the corporation during the
time relevant to the attorney’s current representation of the
corporation, (2) the former employee possesses knowledge relevant to
the attorney’s current representation of the corporation, and (3) the
purpose of the communication is to assist the attorney in (a)
evaluating whether the employee’s conduct has bound or would bind
the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences , if any, of that
conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that
have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.68

The Hanover court noted that only a small number of federal
courts have been faced with deciding whether to extend Upjohn to
former employees.69 The court discovered that both the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits adopted the Upjohn concurrence, and that nearly all
federal courts, with the exception of one district court, have held
that the Upjohn privilege extends to former employees in certain
circumstances.70
Likewise, the court in Peralta v. Cendent Corp. found that the
line between privileged and non-privileged communications is
based upon the ex-employee’s conduct and knowledge regarding the
matter being investigated.71 Courts that protect privileged
communications with former employees view the mutual duty
between the employer-employee as a relevant but not a conclusive
consideration.72 Pro-privilege courts focus on the former employee’s
conduct and knowledge while he or she was still employed.73
Therefore, if the attorney asserts the communication is privileged,
the attorney must assert that the privilege arises out of the former
employees conduct and knowledge while previously employed. 74
Peralta created the standard in Connecticut when determining
whether communication between counsel for a corporation and a
former employee is protected under the attorney-client privilege.75
Both the standard in Peralta and Hanover adopt Justice Burger’s
information beyond the underlying facts of this case that Surles might unearth
by questioning Weisser about his conversations with Air France's counsel would
likely expose defense counsel's thought processes which are entitled to
protection under the work product doctrine.”).
67. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 304 F.R.D. 494 (2015).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Becker, supra note 55 at 240.
75. Id.
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concurrence to determine whether privilege exists between former
employees and the client-corporations.
The adoption of the Upjohn concurrence was not, however,
universal prior to Newman. For example, in Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift
Parts Mfg. Co., the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that Upjohn does not include postemployment communications with former employees of a
corporation.76 There, defendant-corporation withheld information
provided by a former employee of its corporation during discovery. 77
Defendant-corporation objected to discovery requests on the basis
of attorney-client privilege.78 In Clark, the Northern District Court
followed Wigmore’s eight point formulation in defining what
attorney-client privilege entails.79 The Clark Court revealed that
post-employment communications with former employees are not
protected communications.80 The district court determined that
former employees (1) have no interest in the outcome of the
litigation, (2) willingness to provide information is unrelated to
direction from corporate superiors, and (3) have no duty to their
former employer.81 The court noted that third parties can be freely
interviewed by either party.82 Clark held that former employees are
indistinguishable from third parties because former employees no
longer have a duty or agency-relationship with the former
employer.83

III. ANALYSIS
When a corporation is notified of potential wrongdoing the
corporation responds by initiating an internal investigation.84 A
corporate internal investigation allows the corporate entity to

76. Clark Equip. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 1985).
77. Id. at *8-11.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *12-13.
80. See also id. at *12-14 (stating:
“Former employees are not the client. They share no identity of interest
in the outcome of the litigation. Their willingness to provide information
is unrelated to the directions of their former corporate superiors, and
they have no duty to their former employer to provide such information.
It is virtually impossible to distinguish the position of a former employee
from any other third party who might have pertinent information about
one or more corporate parties to a lawsuit”).
81. Id. at *14.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal
Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constitutes, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73
(2013).
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discover misconduct within the corporation.85 “Corporations are
notified of possible wrongdoing through various sources, including
internal whistleblowers, external qui tam actions,86 routine
internal compliance measures implemented in response to
sentencing incentives, and judicial acknowledgments that
corporate compliance is a necessary component of corporate
governance.”87 Internal investigations can also include criminal
action against a corporation.88 In this context, the legislature
incentivizes the corporation’s compliance.89 Essentially, the
government promotes investigations to uncover misconduct and
information recovered which may survive a motion to compel on the
theory of attorney-client privilege.90
Internal investigations allow the corporation to improve policy
and ensure the company is in compliance with the corporation’s
policy and regulatory schemes.91 The investigations encourage
corporations to explore allegations while the company maintains its
reputation.92
Theoretically,
corporate-counsel
facilitates
85. Id. at 73-74; See also MARK P. GOODMAN & DANIEL J. FETTERMAN,
CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, IN DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 87, 91 (Daniel J. Fetterman &
Mark P. Goodman eds., 2011) (discussing management obligation to
investigation alleged wrongdoing to minimize the company’s risk).
86. See, e.g. United States ex rel Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S.Ct.
2230 (2009) (illustrating that in a qui tam action, a private party called
a relator brings an action on the government's behalf. The government, not the
relator, is considered the real plaintiff. If the government succeeds, the relator
receives a share of the award. Also called a popular action).
87. Green & Podgor, supra note 84, at 90.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 89. There are many incentives for corporations to conduct internal
investigations. For example, corporations may now need to move more swiftly
as new legislation--such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002--places added
requirements on corporations to timely report misconduct. Other recent
statutes similarly require corporations to report misconduct, and an internal
investigation may be necessary to assess whether the reporting is mandatory.
Leniency programs also can incentivize a corporation to investigate misconduct
and self-report.
90. See Fava, supra note 15, at 3 (quoting that “During the course of an
internal investigation, the client may decide to disclose certain investigative
findings to government or regulatory authorities. In certain contexts, such
disclosures would be made to the U.S. Department of Justice and/or U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. The deliberate and voluntary disclosure
of privileged information or documents to government authorities can result in
the waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, which can
subject the information or documents to potential discovery in other litigation,
including related or parallel civil actions. However, in the event that the
government compels the production of information or documents through the
use of a subpoena, the disclosure could be construed as ‘involuntary’ and the
disclosure would, in certain circumstances, waive privilege only with respect to
the government and not as to any other party”).
91. Green and Podger, supra note 84, at 73.
92. Id.
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appropriate action and properly advises corporate -clients when a
robust investigation is necessary.93 However, the judicial and
legislative branch demonstrate concern that internal investigations
allow corporations to abuse in-house oversight under the blanket of
attorney-client privilege.94 Corporate-counsel led internal
investigations may result in potential abuses by withholding
relevant information under the thin veil of attorney-client
privilege.95
The
corporation’s
ability
to
characterize
communications with former employees as privileged can frustrate
the fact-finding process.96 Specifically, corporate-counsel may
discover less than favorable information from an agent of the
corporation and withhold that information during pre -trial
discovery.97 Corporate-counsel disclosure of relevant information in
legal proceedings promotes public policy.98 Corporate attorneyclient privilege applies where such privilege is essential to facilitate
communications with corporate counsel.99 Corporations may
compel employees to disclose relevant information to aid corporatecounsel and threaten termination if employees withhold such
information.100 If an employee discloses information of misconduct,
that information belongs to the corporation.101 As a result, the
corporation may distance itself from the alleged wrongdoer in order
to avoid liability.102

93. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
94. See Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal
Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 425 n.45 (2007) (highlighting that even
when prosecutors are involved after internal investigation, agreements are not
overseen by the court).
95. See Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party’s Former
Employees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and constraints, 51 MD. L. REV. 239,
246 (1992) (asserting that the potential for abuse of this vital discovery tool
demands court intervention and monitoring. Of foremost concern is the
possibility that counsel will, either through subtle suggestions or unabashed
indoctrination, manipulate the former employee’s recollection of key events).
96. Id. (quoting that the initial contact may so intimidate the ex-employee
that she will refuse to participate in the factfinding process absent a court order,
and even if so ordered, will not be entirely forthcoming regarding the
information she possesses).
97. Weissman & Newman supra note 94 at 425 n.45; see Pappas v. Holloway,
114 Wn.2d 198, 203-04 (1990) (citing Dike v. Dike, 75, Wn.2d 1, 11 (1968)
(reasoning that because privilege sometimes results in the exclusion of evidence
which is otherwise relevant and material, contrary to the philosophy that
justice can be achieved only with the fullest disclosure of facts, the privilege
cannot be treated as absolute; rather, it must be strictly limited to the purpose
for which it exists).
98. Green & Podgor, supra note 85, at 73-126.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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A. Newman’s Bright-Line Aims to Prevent Corporations
from Withholding Discoverable Facts
The Newman holding emphasizes the minority view and
federal courts’ refusal to extend the corporate attorney-client
privilege to post-employment communications between corporatecounsel and former employees.103 The Newman Court begins its
analysis by recognizing that our open civil judicial system allows
parties to obtain discovery regarding any unprivileged matter that
is relevant.104 However, privileged information is shielded from
discovery.105 Attorney-client privilege recognizes that full and frank
communications between attorneys and clients serves public ends
in which counsel can only provide adequate legal advice where such
communication occurs.106 The Newman majority relies primarily on
the agency relationship to create a bright-line rule that privilege
does not extend to communications with former employees. 107 In
Washington state, not all conversations with attorneys are
automatically privileged.108 While necessary to obtain the fullest
disclosure of facts, the danger of including all communication may
“result in the exclusion of evidence which is otherwise relevant and
material.”109 The Newman Court found that Highland School
District, like any organization, can only act through its constituents
and agents.110 “But everything changes when employment ends.
When the employer-employee relationship terminates, this
generally terminates the agency relationship.” 111 Without the
employee-employer agency relationship, the Newman majority
argues that the former employee no longer owes duties of loyalty,
obedience, or confidentiality to the corporation.112 Without those
duties, a former employee is indistinguishable from a third-party to
a lawsuit who may be freely interviewed by either party to the
lawsuit.113
The Newman majority did not extend privilege to postemployment
communications.114
The
Newman
majority
103. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)
111. Id.
112. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
113. Id.; see also Infosystems, Inc., 197 F.R.D. at 305 (asserting that “[i]t is
virtually impossible to distinguish the position of a former employee from any
other third party who might have pertinent information about one or more
corporate parties to a lawsuit”) (quoting Clark Equip. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15457 at *14).
114. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
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undervalued the importance of the former employed employee’s
conduct by focusing on when the agency relationship terminates. 115
The Newman court reasoned that the importance of allowing either
party to uncover material facts in discovery outweighs extending
the privilege to former employees.116 In contrast, Highland argued
that privilege should extend to communications with its former
coaches because their conduct, while employed, may expose the
corporation to vicarious liability. 117 While those concerns are valid,
the Newman majority holds “they do not justify expanding the
attorney-client privilege beyond its purpose.”118 According to the
Court, that underlying purpose is to foster full and frank
communications between counsel and the client-corporation not
former employees.119 The Newman majority asserts that focusing on
the employer-employee agency relationship preserves a predictable
legal framework where privilege may be readily recognized. 120 The
Newman majority was unable “to find any principled line of
demarcation” where communication between the former employee
and corporate-counsel exist “beyond the end of the employment
relationship.”121 The Newman majority was unconvinced that the
corporation’s need to know the former employees’ knowledge
provides a justification to extend privilege to communications to
the same.122 The Newman ruling is consistent with the holding in
Clark because the court found that former employees have no
identity of interest in the outcome of litigation.123

B. Are Former Employees and Third-Parties
Indistinguishable for Purposes of Attorney-Client
Privilege?
The Upjohn Court rejected the control-group test, in-part,
because the relationship requirement restriction created a brightline rule between corporate executives and lower-level employees
who withhold the relevant information. The Upjohn privilege,
however, does require some relationship between the informationprovider and corporate-counsel.124 Newman, along with a small
115. Id.
116. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 (quoting that the purpose of the pre-trial
discovery mechanisms established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
“for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial”).
117. See Newman, 281 P.3d at 1193.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Clark Equip. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *14.
124. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate AttorneyClient Privilege., 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 497 (1982).
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minority of federal courts, holds that the employer-employee
relationship ends when employment is terminated. 125 The Newman
Court’s rationale mirrored that made by the District Court of
Illinois in Clark.126 As explained above, Clark reasoned that former
employees are analogous to third-parties because they have no
interest in the outcome of the litigation. 127 Former employees have
no interest in the litigation because they no longer owe a duty to the
corporation.128 In Clark, the Court suggested former employees are
virtually indistinguishable from a third-party who may have
relevant information.129 The court further opined that postemployment communications with former employees do not receive
the shield of privilege simply because the former employees have
knowledge of pertinent facts.130 As such, the court suggested that
because the attorney-client privilege encourages frank and full
communication between the client and counsel, that privilege only
extends to communications between corporate-counsel and the
client-corporation.131 The former employee - much like an employee
or a third party - is not the client and therefore not represented by
corporate-counsel.132 Thus, former employees are functionally
parallel
to
third-parties
and
those
“post-employment
communications … are not within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.”133
The functional approach established in Upjohn,134 taken
literally, “would bar application of the privilege to communications
with the attorney by former employees of a corporation” regardless
if they were “directly involved in matters under investigation.” 135
Newman’s agency requirement invariably prevents corporatecounsel from engaging in confidential discussions with a former
employee even though the former employee’s knowledge existed
while that agency relationship was intact. 136 In other words,

125. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
126. Id.
127. Clark Equip. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *14.
128. Newman, 281 P.3d at 1191.
129. See Clark Equip. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *14 (quoting
“[t]he reasoning of Upjohn does not support extension of the attorney-client
privilege to cover post-employment communications with former employees of a
corporate party. Former employees are not the client. They share no identity of
interest in the outcome of the litigation. Their willingness to provide
information is unrelated to the directions of their former corporate superiors,
and they have no duty to their former employer to provide such information”).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *13.
132. Id. at *14.
133. Id.
134. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, W., concurring). Upjohn required that
under the functional analysis, the communication with the attorney must be
authorized by a superior.
135. Sexton, supra note 124, at 499.
136. Id.

140

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:125

Newman holds that the timing of the employer-employee
relationship is the distinction between whether post-employment
communications are protected.137 But, a “formalistic distinction
based solely on the timing of the interview” frustrates the goal in
Upjohn.138 Although Upjohn specifically limited the scope of
privilege to current employees, the attorney-client privilege
requires certainty that “conversation between the attorney and
client will remain privileged after the employee leaves.” 139 Upjohn’s
holding ensures that corporate-counsel’s communication with any
person involved in the activity which might embroil the corporation
in liability is protected.140

C. Newman’s Chilling Effect on the Upjohn Privilege
Limiting the application of Upjohn to circumstances where a
witness is a current employee that owes a duty to the clientcorporation ultimately frustrates the underlying basis for the
attorney-client privilege and the rationale of Upjohn.141 How can
the same considerations be privileged on the day the witness is
employed, but not be privileged on the very next day when the
witness is an ex-employee? Newman may deter an attorney from
interviewing a witness for fear that the facts and circumstances of
the interview will not be privileged.142 In sum, the Newman court
fails to provide a convincing rationale in response to the argument
that the underlying facts are not protected, only the work product
of the attorney.143 Courts have held that corporate-counsel
communication with a former employee may be deemed privileged
where elements of the attorney-client privilege are satisfied.144
Newman essentially adopts a bright-line rule with no purpose or
rationale.145 The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege
137. Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1197 (Wash.
2016).
138. Sexton, supra note 124, at 499.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 500.
141. See Hanover Ins. Co., 30 F.R.D. at 498-99 (citing that “it is clear to this
Court that some privilege exists between counsel for a corporation and former
employees of the corporation”).
142. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1194.
143. Id. at 1199.
144. Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118 (E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Coord.
Pre-Trial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d at 1361 n.7,
cert. denied sub nom; California v. Standard Oil Co., 455 U.S. 990 (1982); Porter
v. Arco Metals Co., Div. of Atl. Richfield Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont.
1986).
145. See Newman, 281 P.3d at 1199 (quoting that the majority implies that
extending the privilege to former employees would lack predictability and would
frustrate the truth-seeking mission of the legal process. While these concerns
are not insignificant, I do not believe they justify the majority's harsh, brightline rule).
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does not suppress the discovery of facts but instead shields the
attorneys’ memoranda and mental processes. 146 In due course,
allowing opposing counsel to gain access to the memoranda reveals
the work product, strategy and advice of counsel for the corporation,
while not affecting the facts known by the witness or the disclosure
of those facts later.147
The dissenting opinion in Newman expressly rejects the brightline rule established by the majority and discusses the reasons why
the majority’s bright-line test will adversely impact attorney
directed investigations.148 The dissent argues that Upjohn’s flexible
analysis extends to “post-employment communications consisting of
a factual inquiry into the former employee’s conduct and
knowledge” while employed, “made in furtherance of the
corporations legal services” and enjoys privileged protection.149 The
dissent explains that the factual inquiry is paramount to allow “full
and frank” fact-finding, which is the underlying purpose of the
attorney-client privilege, in conducting a robust internal
investigation.150
Former employees, just like current employees, may possess
relevant information needed by corporate counsel to perform a
robust investigation and to provide competent legal advice to the
client.151 Such crucial information does not lose relevance, nor
should it lose privilege, simply because employment has ended.152
The application of the attorney-client privilege should not disappear
based solely on when counsel conducted the interview, nor on the
current employment status of the witness. 153 The Newman dissent
asserts that the underlying basis for privilege would be muddled if
the timing of the interview became the distinguishing factor for
whether communications are afforded protection.154
Most courts agree that communications with former employees
regarding the scope of their employment are privileged. 155 In
146. WEBB, TARUN & MOLO, supra note 2, at 6-18.
147. See Newman, 381 P.3d at 1201 (quoting that to the extent
communication between the former coaches and Highland's attorneys concerns
a factual inquiry into the former coaches' conduct and knowledge during his or
her employment, any such communications are privileged, and Highland need
not answer questions regarding these communications. Post-employment
communications between the former employer's counsel and a former employee
that constitute a relevant factual inquiry into their conduct and knowledge
during employment would be privileged, consistent with Upjohn).
148. Id. at 1194.
149. Id. at 1195.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)).
152. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1197.
153. Id. (quoting Sexton, supra note 124).
154. Id.
155. Fava, supra note 15, at 3; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Hunt v. MerckMedco Managed Care, L.L.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (stating
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Peralta, the Court recognized that privileged communications
between an employee and corporate counsel do not automatically
lose protected status upon termination of the agency relationship. 156
There, plaintiff-corporation asserted attorney-client privilege and
withheld communications from a former employee.157 The Peralta
majority held that
the line
between “non-privileged
communications with former employees should not be difficult to
apply if the essential point is kept in mind: did the communication
relate to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge, or
communication with defendant’s counsel, during his or her
employment?”158 Therefore, if the communication is within the
scope of the former employees conduct while employed, then those
communications are shielded by attorney-client privilege.159 The
Peralta majority determined that conduct rather than agency is the
line for whether communications are privileged. 160 Peralta follows
the majority approach when determining whether privilege extends
to former employees because it focuses on the conduct and
information of the former employee stemming from their actual
employment with a corporation where that knowledge embroils
corporate liability.161

IV. PROPOSAL
This section proposes solutions to safeguard against potential
attorney-client conflicts with former employees. First, it will discuss
how Newman dangerously and unnecessarily narrows the corporate
attorney-client privilege for the unwary practitioner and this
section will solve the problem that Newman presents. Then, this
section will address how the solution requires that the practitioner
understand the underlying fundamental decision in Upjohn in
order to reject the control-group test because it was too restrictive
on the attorney-client privilege.

A. Why Newman Matters
Newman needlessly restricts the corporate attorney-client
privilege for the diligent practitioner. But, does the ruling matter?

“the line to be drawn is not difficult: if the communication sought to be elicited
relates to Ms. Elliot's conduct or knowledge during her employment with Medco
Defendants, or if it concerns conversations with corporate counsel that occurred
during her employment, the communication is privileged; if not, attorney-client
privilege does not apply”).
156. Infosystems, Inc., 197 F.R.D. at 305.
157. Id.
158. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Clearly in the State of Washington an attorney must be aware of
Newman. Likewise, the cautious practitioner must perform a
conflicts of law analysis to determine if Washington law applies. 162
It is unlikely, however, that Newman will gain traction outside
of Washington State. Most federal courts have interpreted Upjohn
to include former employees.163 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
unequivocally accepted the principle that Upjohn extends to protect
communications between a corporate-attorney and a former
employee of a corporation.164 Similarly, the case law discussed
above demonstrates the overwhelming inclination of Federal Courts
to extend the attorney-client privilege to include interviews with
former employees pursuant to the Burger concurrence. 165 Clark and
Newman nonetheless present a troubling minority position.
Even if Upjohn protections and attorney-client privilege exists,
counsel is unlikely to share her work-product or privileged
information with the witness.166 The attorney is hired to give advice
to the client, not witnesses. 167 Attorneys are very capable of

162. FED. R. EVID. 501. State common law will almost always apply to any
claim of privilege.
163. See Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
privilege applied to former employees); Infosystems, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 303
(affirming that there may be situations where the former employee retains a
present connection or agency relationship with the client corporation, or where
the present-day communication concerns a confidential matter that was
uniquely within the knowledge of the former employee when he worked for the
client corporation, such that counsel’s communications with this former
employee must be cloaked with the privilege in order for meaningful factgathering to occur; In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40
(finding communications between former employee and corporate counsel
privileged).
164. See Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41 n.1 (stating “[a]ccording to the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers [§ 73 cmt. e], the attorneyclient privilege would not normally attach to communications between former
employees and counsel for the former employer” in the absence of “a continuing
duty to the corporation” based on agency principles); Infosystems, Inc., 197
F.R.D. 303 (recognizing “there may be situations where the former employee
retains a present connection or agency relationship with the client corporation”
that would justify application of the privilege).
165. See Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40 (finding communications between former
employee and corporate counsel privileged); Mathias, 197 F.R.D. 29;
Infosystems, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 303; In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1361 n.7.
166. See Fava, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing that in the event counsel
conducts a risk assessment and finds evidence of impropriety, counsel can take
immediate steps to ensure that misconduct is investigated in a way that allows
for the protections of the attorney-client privilege).
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(quoting “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)”).
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understanding and following the law.168 Under a jurisdiction that
applies the Newman analysis, the former employee will be treated
like any other third-party witness and the attorney should take all
reasonable steps to protect privilege, confidentiality and work
product materials.169
Newman does compel the attorney to promptly and diligently
investigate as soon as possible while the witnesses are still
employed.170 Promptly interviewing witnesses while they are still
employed can mitigate the impact of Newman.171 It is vital to
interview relevant witnesses and employees immediately to protect
against a fading memory and potential for lost documents.
Attorneys should avoid becoming a victim of the Newman majority
simply for not immediately commencing an investigation.
The essential point of Newman is clear. Attorneys must know
prior to the interview whether the privilege applies and act
accordingly. Newman merely transfers the witness from privileged
status to the run of the mill third-party witness where no privilege
applies. Attorneys acting accordingly and any application of
Newman can be appropriately mitigated. However, the bottom line
of Newman fails to address the policy implications of withholding
privileges between counsel and a former employee. Specifically, the
privilege in the corporate setting encourages both former and
current employees to reveal information that, absent privilege, they
would not reveal.172

B. The Practitioner Should Conduct Her Analysis
Pursuant to the Burger Concurrence in Upjohn
The Upjohn Court “assumed that application of the privilege
induces
significant
additional
communications.” 173
That
assumption paired with the underlying framework, that former
employees could embroil corporations, justifies extending the
privilege to former employees. Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence

168. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(quoting that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation”).
169. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(quoting that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client); See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2013) (quoting that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation).
170. See Newman, 381 P.3d at 1197 (discussing how the Newman majority
emphasizes timing of the interview versus the purpose of attorney-client
privilege established in Upjohn).
171. Id.
172. Sexton, supra note 124, at 467.
173. Id.

2018]

Corporate Internal Investigations in Post-Upjohn Era

145

in Upjohn created a three-factor test to establish whether postemployment communication with a former employee is
privileged.174 The communication may be privileged if (1) the former
employee’s conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (2)
there are legal consequences arising from the former employee’s
conduct; or (3) counsel forms appropriate legal responses to actions
that have been or may be taken by others regarding that conduct. 175
In Newman, Highland’s counsel argued that its
communications with the former coaches should be shielded by
attorney-client privilege because the conduct of the former coaches
while employed embroiled the school district in litigation. The
important distinction that Newman and courts alike failed to
consider was that underlying facts are inherently discoverable.
While a witness cannot be compelled to answer what was said in
confidence to her corporate-counsel, the witness may not refuse to
disclose relevant facts simply because she communicated those facts
to a corporate-counsel.176 The Newman majority did not want
corporations to have the ability to shield potentially harmful
information under the veil of attorney-client privilege.
A corporation can structure even its routine transactions so that
information is not rendered in any discoverable form until it is
transmitted to the corporation's attorney. In this way, the
information can be given the character of a privileged communication
by funneling it through the corporate counsel's office. Of course, if one
assumes, as the Upjohn Court did, that most corporate actors
voluntarily comply with the law, the possibility of using the privilege
to circumvent the rules of discovery is not alarming. To the extent
that some corporate actors are willing to employ this “funneling”
tactic to shield otherwise discoverable information, however, there is
cause for concern.177

The Burger concurrence balances the importance of privileged
communications with the tools of discovery.178 Privileged postemployment communications ensure client-corporations receive
complete advice from corporate-counsel. While discovery may be
frustrated, “discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions … on wits borrowed from the
adversary.”179 The bright-line rule established in Newman rewards
lazy practitioners and punishes corporate-counsel for conducting a
robust investigation - hardly the goal purported in Upjohn.
The minority position on whether post-employment
174. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, W., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Sexton, supra note 124, at 477-78.
177. Id.
178. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, W., concurring).
179. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 516).
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communications are privileged focuses on the agency relationship.
When employment ends, so does any possibility of privilege. To
overcome the minority position, corporate-counsel should perform
exit-interviews before employees end their employment.
Essentially, if an interview is done while the agency relationship
still exists, then that communication is privileged. Realistically,
Highland School District knew or should have known that a student
sustaining a debilitating brain injury while playing for its football
team would become litigious. Highland’s counsel should have
foreseen the possibility of litigation and conducted an interview of
the relevant actors while the agency relationship existed. If
Highland’s counsel did so, then the Washington Supreme Court
may have recognized that communication as privileged. The
organized practitioner recognizes that courts value the agency
relationship and in order to satisfy the minority position, exit
interviews should always be conducted in order to protect the
corporation.

V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the attorney-client privilege outweighs the
potential concerns for its abuse. The Supreme Court in Upjohn
adopted the unanimous position that reducing the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate setting damaged the ability of corporatecounsel to adequately advise the client-corporation. Newman and
cases alike threaten the ability of corporate-counsel to adequately
advise the corporate-client because former employees may have
access to necessary privileged information needed for corporate
counsel to sufficiently direct the course of litigation. The result of
Newman frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and
demonstrates a troubling minority that aims to make the corporate
attorney-client privilege porous.

